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AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MODEL FOR TEACHING 
AN UNDERGRADUATE COURSE ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 
by 
Nina Compton· and Lizbeth G. Ellis·· 
During the Spring semester of 1993, the business college at New Mexico 
State University (NMSU) offered a class entitled "Law and Economics". This 
course was created in response to th.e perceived need to acconunodate the interests 
of undergraduate business students who were seeking a law-related business 
elective in their program of studies. The course was taught in team fashion by an 
economist and the senior business law faculty member at NMSU. 
The course proposed to provide undergraduate business students with an 
appreciation of the coextensive nature of economics and the American legal 
system. 1 The business college was interested in offering interdisciplinary electives 
that promoted critical thinking while developing the student's understanding of the 
interrelationships between various business disciplines. At the same time, the 
college had faculty within the economics department and legal studies field who 
were both interested in exploring the expanding role of economic analysis in legal 
reasoning including applications outside the typical market issues2, as well as 
practical applications of economic analysis in the courtroom.3 With these factors 
in mind. a course on law and economics provided a perfect fit. 
This article describes the framework for a course that is not widely offered 
in business colleges, but warrants consideration by programs at other business 
• Associate Professor of Legal Studies, New Mexico State University. 
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schools. Although the course at NMSU was offered as an undergraduate course. 
the course could be taught as a graduate seminar in a masters program with equal 
success. A few comments regarding the nature of our university and the 
characteristics of the business program will be helpful in evaluating the value that 
a course of this type might have for programs of study at other schools. 
The University Forum 
The forum for the new course, NMSU, is located in the city of Las Cruces 
in southern New Mexico. NMSU presently serves about 15,500 students, and 
approximately 2,100 are enrolled in the College of Business Administration and 
Economics. As suggested by the name of the college, the economics discipline is 
housed in the business college, rather than in the liberal arts college as is the case 
at many universities. The administrative and physical proximity of the legal 
studies and economics disciplines at NMSU enhances the opportunity for 
collaborative efforts between faculty in these two fields. Law courses in the 
NMSU business school curriculum are designed to emphasize the legal 
environment within which businesses operate. Undergraduate students stlldying 
for the Bachelor of Business Administration are required to take either a traditional 
business law course (emphasizing contract law) or a legal environment course, at 
their option. The business law faculty is encouraged to develop junior and senior 
level elective courses that build upon the basic law foundation in a manner that is 
relevant to business students. An advanced law class that pertains to a specific 
business discipline was perceived as particularly valuable to the education of 
students in the business college.4 
The Law and Economics course was offered as a senior level three-hour 
general elective in the wtdergraduate program. As seniors, all the students 
enrolled in the course had already met the core curriculum requirements for their 
major course of study within the College of Business, which as a practical matter 
meant each student had taken a foundation law course and at least several basic 
economics courses. No additional prerequisite courses were required of students 
enrolling in the Law and Economics class. The course was well received by the 
students and was strongly supported by both the Department of Economics and the 
Department of Finance which houses the legal studies faculty. 
As will be the case in most business schools, no single instructor at NMSU 
holds both a law degree and a terminal degree in economics. Accordingly, it was 
essential for the course to be taught in team fashion with an instructor from each 
discipline willing to invest the time and effort to learn more about the other's area 
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of expertise. s Although the economist teaching this comse had virtually no fonnal 
legal training and the lawyer had very little backgrowtd in economics, each was 
excited by the prospect of learning from each other. Rather than disguise their 
lack of expertise, the instructors routinely asked each other questions in class. 
Students responded favorably to the more relaxed atmosphere engendered by 
learning with the instructors and showed an atypical willingness to actively 
participate in discussions. 
Some background on law and economics may be useful to the business law 
professor who might consider offering such a course. 
Law And Economics Basics 
For over a century, both economists and legal academicians have applied 
economic thought and reasoning to legal issues.6 Early econontic analrsis of the 
law focused predominantly on market-related topics such as antitrust, taxation8 
and labor law.9 Beginning in about 1960, economic analysis of the law changed 
significantly both in terms of methodology and subject matter. The use of formal 
mathematical models for economic analysis of the law became fashionable10 and 
economic analysis moved from strictly market-related subjects to non-market 
issues, such as marriage, 11 crime12 and discrimination. 13 This new conception of 
law and economics as a field of inquiry has often been referred to as the "law & 
economics movement". 14 The movement was dominated by a group of politically 
conservative microeconomists with a strong pro-market and anti-government 
bias/5 commonly referred to as the "Chicago school" econontists.16 Many such 
economists take the position that economic analysis provides a useful framework 
for understanding all human behavior. 17 Their work is harshly criticized by many 
other economists and jurists who are skeptical about whether models developed to 
predict market behavior have any value when applied to non-market activities, 
who question whether the primary purpose of the law should be the promotion of 
economic efficiency (as defined by the Chicago school econontists) and who are 
dubious about markets as a method for achieving social justice. 18 
Microeconomic analysis of market transactions can be reduced to relatively 
simplistic terms, albeit with some risk of diminished accuracy. The analysis is 
based on three fundamental premises. First, there is an inverse relationship 
between the price charged and the quantity demanded.19 Second, people act as 
"rational maximizers of their satisfactions" ?0 In other words, people deploy the 
resources they control so as to maximize the utility or benefit that can be obtained 
from those resources based on the individual's unique preferences. Third, 
142 
assuming certain ideal conditions including a perfectly competitive market where 
voluntary exchange is permitted, resources will gravitate toward their most 
valuable use so that "economic efficiency" is achieved.21 Efficiency is defined as 
using economic resources in such a way that their value (defined as human 
satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and 
services) is maximized.22 Microeconomic analysis is subject to many criticisms, 
perhaps the most common of which is that the many assumptions upon which it is 
based are Wlrealistic or simply incorrect in many specific instances.23 Despite the 
criticism, this type of economic analysis is taught in an introductory economics 
course at virtually every major university. 
When examining the legal system, the microeconomist adopts still .another 
premise: rules of law operate to impose prices or provide subsidies on specific 
human behaviors or decisions?4 Based on this premise, the rnicroeconomist 
attempts to predict the law's effect on value and efficiency (as they define these 
terms).25 This effort is less controversial when applied to laws and court decisions 
regulate market behavior (such as antitrust laws, taxation of specific products, 
restraints on alienation of property) than when applied to laws regulating non-
market activities such as whether to marry or divorce, drive carefully or a 
crime. The microeconomists' attempts to predict the effect of specific laws on 
"economic efficiency" in these non-market activities are highly controversial. 
To illustrate, economic analysis suggests that legalizing a free market in 
human babies would be economically efficient, i.e. human welfare w.ould be 
maximized. Based on economic analysis, it can be argued that legal restrictions on 
trafficking in babies keep supply and demand out of balance. Economic analysis 
predicts that in a free market where biological parents could be paid for babies, the 
supply of babies available for adoption would increase and the "price" paid 
(pecuniary and other) to obtain a child would decrease. Accordingly, there would 
be an increase in overall human welfare?6 While the microeconomist purports to 
make no judgment as to whether "efficiency" is good, just or socially or ethically 
desirable, the mere exercise of evaluating the "efficiency" of legal rules and 
decisions suggests that such economists believe there is some value in applying an 
efficiency criterion to the law. 
The controversy among economists and jurists over the use of micro-
economic analysis of law provides an excellent framework for promoting critical 
thinking and analysis. The lawyer, even one who is not well-versed in economics, 
can play a vital role in this effort by interjecting inquiries about equity and social 
justice into the analysis. This may. be particularly important if the economist 
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instructor's personal ideology is that of a "true believer" in the Chicago-school 
approach. 
Wlu1e the so-called law & economics movement has been characterized as 
an "intellecrual fad" of the 1970s,27 in its aftennath there are now four journals 
devoted to the economic analysis of law and most major law schools now have at 
least one PhD economist on their faculties.28 The explicit use of economic 
analysis in court opinions is much more frequent and economists are conunonly 
recognized as expert witnesses in a variety of legal proceedings. Thus, while the 
marriage of law and economics may be a stormy one, it appears certain to remain 
intact for the foreseeable future and continues to offer fertile ground for srudy and 
debate. 
Course Design And Methodology 
The instructors' philosophy in designing the course was that class 
participation and active student involvement is paramount to the learning process. 
The goal of the team teaching effort was to facilitate a pro-active rather than 
reactive. response by students. Students were expected to become involved 
participants in exploring the interface between economics and the law. To achieve 
the desired student participation, the instructors sought to substitute a somewhat 
softened Socratic approach for the traditional lecture. Except for the first three 
class periods which were used for a an overview of the field of law and 
economics, a review of basic economic principles and a review of basic legal 
principles respectively, most class periods were treated as a roundtable discussion 
on the assigned readings. The instructors channeled the discussion through direct 
thought provoking questions. Students were expected to articulate and defend a 
particular position or response. The class was limited to ten students, which 
allowed the use of the seminar format combined with occasional lecture sessions. 
Discussion topics covered a broad range of recent issues in the area of law 
and economics. Fortunately, there is a wealth of interesting topics that illustrate 
how economic principles relate to the legal policies that shape our society. Course 
topics were arranged in building block fashion, presenting an increasingly 
sophisticated level of scholastic inquiry. Some of the topics discussed included: 
the legal versus economic concepts of property rights, valuation of human 
resources at trial, the economist's role in the divorce case, and economic principles 
applied to natural resource issues such as pollution control. Each topic was 
developed in both its legal and economic implications. Appendix A contains a 
"Course Outline" with a detailed list of discussion topics. 
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Reading assignments for the course were taken from two required textbooks 
and supplemented with relevant jomnal articles and court opinions. The two 
required texts were Robin Paul Malloy's Law and Economics, A Comparative 
Approach to Theory and Practice29 and A. Mitchell Polinsky's Introduction to Law 
and Economics, Second Edition. 30 Both of these texts complimented the 
interdisciplinary nature and team-teaching format of the course. reading 
assignments were supplemented with relevant journal articles and court opinions . . 
A complete list of reading assignments arranged by topic (in the same sequence as 
the course outline) is found in Appendix B. 
Although the reading list was rather ambitious when compared with other 
business courses, the instructors nonetheless chose to include numerous court 
decisions. The use of illustrative cases, for both lectures and discussion, was 
extremely effective in sparking interest and discussion. The use of actual cases 
added a real-world dimension to the application of the abstract concepts that 
students were expected to learn. The reading list included articles and cases that 
students were unlikely to have encountered in a previous law or economics class. 
Avoiding a duplication of coverage protected the academic integrity of the class. 
The evaluation of student performance was based on two exams that 
utilized essay and short answer questions together with one research paper. For 
the research paper, students were required to select a topic from a list provided by 
the instructors or to obtain approval for topics they selected. Topics for papers 
were selected primarily from current issues presently before state or federal courts. 
Students manuscripts were expected to be ten to pages in length and 
thoroughly researched. The research effort was docwnented through a 
bibliography attached to the paper. Students subsequently presented their research 
papers for the edification of the class as a whole, with ensuing discussion solicited 
from class members. Student comments indicated that the project, although 
rigorous due to the complex nature of the literature on many of the topics, 
provided an exceptionally enlightening learning experience. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss each of the course 
topics in detail, a few examples of substantive areas of law and the related 
economic analysis will serve to illustrate the nature of the course and the 
instructors' approach to integrating the study of law and economics. 
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Race And Sex Discrimination In The Labor Market 
The law relating to race and sex discrimination is well known to business 
law_ is generally addressed in the foru1dation law course. However, 
have become the focus of economic analysis, and a 
d1scuss1on of these issues is typically beyond the scope of the 
foundanon law the study of legal and economic principles as 
they relate to discnmmabon m the labor market was particularly appropriate for 
the Law and Economics course. 
The in.quiry for which economics may provide insight is: how do 
w_e <!iscr:mmanon bas occurred? Increasingly, evidence of race and sex 
m the labor market is1provided by economists in the courtroom. 
The mtellectual of the trend is University of Chicago economist Gary 
published The Economics of Discrimination in 1957.31 This seminal 
led the way for the use of economists as expert witnesses in cases 
both. and employment discrimination on racial and gender grounds. 
have placed increased reliance on the empirical proof 
of discrunmation proVIded by econometric methods.32 
Econometric methods involve building mathematical models of human 
model is merely an abstraction of reality: a small version of the real 
thing (m. this case the_ labor market) that should (if it is constructed correctly) 
behave like the real thing. The benefit of the econometric model is its ability to 
present t? the (in this case a jury) that which is obscured by the 
compleXIty foWld m reahty. For example, econometric models on wage and 
employment can the actual, observed values of wages and 
employment of vanous groups With those that the model indicates would have 
been expected to occur in the absence of discrimination. Where the actual data on 
wages and employment differ from the values predicted by the model there is 
evidence of discrimination. 33 ' 
Attot?eys now conunonly rely upon economists in the courtroom to provide 
such a for .defining and establishing the presence of various 
types of discrmunahon. Opposmg attorneys typically seek to discredit the results 
of sll:ch (with the help of expert economist witnesses) by pointing out 
m the model which are typically quantified as "error terms". All 
econometnc models contain error terms that indicate bow much of the observed 
(differences between actual data values and predicted values) is 
explamed by the model, and how much is not. Despite the presence of error terms, 
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courts generally allow juries to consider statistical evidence of discrimination, 
holding that the error terms go to the weight rather than the admissibility of the 
evidence.34 
While sophisticated econometric analysis was beyond the instructional 
scope of this course, the study of race and sex discrimination provided an ideal 
forum in which to provide an introduction to econometrics and its use in the 
cowtroom. By citing existing court cases that have rendered opinions discussing 
the use of econometrics in the courtroom, and by reconstructing the elementary 
forms of econometrics on which the experts relied, students obtained a foundation 
for understanding the relationship between the empirical world of the economist 
and his place in court testimony. 
Recovery Of Hedonic Damages 
A second topic that was particularly successful in terms of stimulating 
discussion and debate was that of the recovery of hedonic damages. All students 
in the class were acquainted with the notion of monetary recovery for personal 
injury and wrongful death as a result of studies in their foundation law course. 
None, however, had considered the problems inherent in valuing human resources. 
Several class periods were devoted to a discussion of the traditional legal 
approach to this problem and the role that the economists has served in these 
valuation problems?5 With this background, students were well prepared to 
consider the latest innovation in this field, the valuation and award of hedonic 
damages, or damages for non-pecuniary value oflife.36 
The phrase "hedonic damages" was coined by economist Stanley Smith?7 
Courts have· defined hedonic damages as either a loss of enjoyment of life or loss 
of life's pleasures?8 Almost everyone intuitively recognizes that an individual's 
life does have inherent value beyond the present value of the individual's future 
earnings. It is this other non-pecuniary value, the value of the joy of living, that is 
referred to as the hedonic value of life. While the existence of hedonic value is 
widely recognized, our legal system has traditionally based awards in wrongful 
death cases primarily on pecuniary losses (loss of income) because courts had no 
method or criteria for placing a dollar value on the hedonic value of the life. 
Recently, economists have developed a variety of techniques to estimate 
hedonic damages. 39 The application of economic tools for estimating the hedonic 
damages oflife has created a storm of controversy. Although courts recognize that 
there is little agreement among economists as to the studies or elements which 
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ought be on the question of valuation of hedonic damages,40 
are to make inroads with respect to the acceptance of such 
applicanons as legrnrnate valuation techniques. 41 . 
the teclmiq?es used to calculate hedonic value involve using some 
surrogate to detemune the value that individuals themselves place on life. 
:rnese techniques attempt. to detennine how much money a person would require 
m payment before acceptmg an increase in the risk of dying, or in the alternative, 
the amowtt of money a. person would be willing to pay to reduce the risk of dying. 
For the estunate may be based on studies regarding the amount of 
money mdiVlduals actually pay to increase their own safety.42 Infonnation on 
consumer purchases of safety items such as smoke detectors and air bags are often 
used: The is to quantify dollars spent by the consumer 
relative to the nsk reduct:J.on obtained from the items purchased. The economist 
can then detennine the "price" a consumer is willing to pay to reduce his or her 
risk of dying. 
. . As a simplistic example, if studies indicate that the average consumer is 
to pay $50, but ?o more, for a detector that reduces the risk of dying 
m a house frre from 4 m 10,000 to 3 m 10,000, the economist would suggest that 
this indicates that the average person places a value of $50 on 1/10 OOOth of the 
person's life .. Therefore, the hedonic value of life is estimated at $500,000 ($50 x 
This does not suggest that this person would exchange his or her life for 
sum of money. It is simply a method for estimating a non-pecuniary value of 
life. 
Other techniques used by economists to measure the hedonic value of life 
are on. studies of wage increases workers must be paid to accept jobs with 
greater hfe The general premise behind these wage and risk studies is that 
the compensation for the accepted level of risk. Typically, the 
econonust use between wages and deaths for a particular job and 
make com?ansons to other JObs. By using statistical comparisons, the economist 
can establish a range for estimating the value of human life. Of course, these 
methods do not actually value life. Instead, measures such as the amount of 
money consumers are willing to pay to increase safety and how much 
remuneration workers are willing to accept for higher risk jobs are after-the-fact 
measures of the actual cost of an incremental statistical increase or decrease in the 
risk of death. 
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Economists have also attempted to estimate the hedonic value oflife using a 
cost approach. This teclurique analyzes variables such as the cost of keeping an 
individual institutionalized or under intensive care in a hospital or incarcerated in 
prison. This analysis suggests that the · amount of money that society is willing to 
spend to maintain life bears some relation to the value that society places on life. 
Critics point out that in none of these contexts is the decision to maintain the life 
based upon a detennination that a life is worth a defmitive amount of money. In 
the case of incarCer-ation, the decision to maintain a life is a political rather than an 
economic decision. In the context of intensive care. it is a medical decision. The 
assumption that the cost of these decisions reflects the value society places on life 
may not be valid. 
The use of economic analysis to estimate hedonic damages has been harshly 
criticized by the defense bar. Defendants argue that the statistical life measures 
advanced by economists measure the cost of changing the statistical risk of death 
or the cost of preserving an anonymous life. but are NOT a measure of the value of 
the life itself.43 Defendants note that the term "damage" usually denotes the 
provable "financial consequences" of injury44 and advance the opinion that the 
hedonic loss is not one which the tort remedy of damages was designed to 
compensate. According to opponents of the award of dan1ages for hedonic loss, 
for a jury to award hedonic damages in a wrongful death action, the jury must 
imagine a future life for the decedent which will never occur and place a monetary 
value upon that life based on nothing more than speculation. guess, or 
conjecture.45 Defendants reject this scenario and embrace the traditional approach 
that limits recovery in wrongful death to the present value of the decedent's future 
projected earnings based on age, earning capacity, health. habits and life 
expectancy.46 For all these reasons, it is argued that expert economic testimony is 
not relevant or admissible on the damages issue in a wrongful death action. 
The controversy surrounding the calculation and award of hedonic damages 
provided the class with insight into the general law of damage recovery, and the 
specialized application of economic theory to that area of law. The debate 
surrounding this issue also offered students insight into the tort refonn movement 
fueled by the liability crisis in this country. Students responded both intellectually 
and emotionally to the issue. Heated discussions were channeled by the 
professors, and provided excellent opportunities for students to articulate opinions 
based upon economic, legal and philosophical analysis. The students indicated 




The Law and Economics course that is the subject of this article was not 
treated as an exclusive forum for the Chicago school economics ideology. Rather, 
the approach of the course was to examine the relationship of law and economics 
in a much broader sense. While some of the micro-economic mathematical 
models were presented and discussed, much of the economic analysis was of a 
more rudimentary nature. Students generally found the study of economic 
more interesting and relevant when applied to actual real world legal 
tssues. Conversely, students come to understand the significance of legal rules to 
business by studying the possible economic consequences of those rules. An 
examination of the tension between the efficiency objective of economics and the 
equity objective oflaw provided a valid forom for the discussion of business ethics 
and the value judgments inherent in economic and legal policy decisions. 
This course demonstrated how the interdisciplinary synergism of team-
!eaching can elevate the role of a business law course and the business law faculty 
m the undergraduate curriculum. Since the legal issues explored in the Law and 
Economics course were ones generally not addressed by the foundation business 
law course, the course served to advance the student's understanding of law in the 
context of a business discipline. The business law faculty served an important role 
in the course by challenging students to defend the application of economic 
principles as applied to legal issues, thus promoting critical thinking. Students 
responded to the unique course content and methodology with a true zeal for 
learning. 
Implementation of a Law and Economics course at other universities can 
promote an understanding of the value and function of the legal studies program. 
The course the opportunity for the business law faculty to provide insight 
for the legal pnnctples that shape modem business policy and procedures. While 
the suggested classroom activities and instructional resources discussed in this 
article can be used as a model for structuring a unit on law and economics the 
success of the study of economics in legal education depends the 
mterest and resolve of the faculty to commit their energies to the course. 
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FLEXJBLE EXAMS IN THE INTRODUCTORY LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
COURSE 
by 
Susan L. Martin. 
Introduction 
Although testing is a most important aspect of the teaching and learning 
process, most business law professors have had little preparation in designing 
evaluation tools. To address this problem which exists for professors in most fields, 
many articles have been written about choosing an appropriate exam format and 
constructing meaningful exams.1 Unfortunately, mere proficiency at creating a 
particular lcind of test no longer seems adequate. No one exam type seems to assess 
well the learning of an increasingly heterogeneous mix of students. Equally important 
are students' perceptions that they cannot do well on certain types of exams. 
After reviewing the usual exam fonnats used in business law classes, this 
article concludes that because of the wide variations in abilities of students and the 
time constraints on professors, a multiple-choice exam that allows students to respond 
in essay fonn can be a useful tool. 
Assessing Students 
Generally, instructors of an introductory legal envirorunent course test students 
to assess several areas of achievement First, instructors want to know that students 
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